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Abstract 
Services contracts have a distinct set of challenges relating to the uncertainty and 
the challenges of measuring performance. Past researchers identified three overarching 
characteristics of interest: service complexity, management capacity, and the relationship 
between the buyer and the contractor. Researchers have often turned to surveys of 
government contracting personnel to take on the challenge of measuring service contract 
performance. This report takes a large-dataset, quantitative approach to looking at service 
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contract outcomes derived from information in the publicly available Federal Procurement 
Data System. This iteration of the report focuses on a newly developed outcome: the extent 
to which the government exercised available options as an indication of positive 
performance outcomes. 
Introduction 
Services contracts have long been understood to be distinct in key ways from their 
product counterparts in ways that add ambiguity and their own sets of challenges. Products 
are countable or otherwise objectively measurable, and while testing to see whether they 
meet requirements can prove complicated and controversial, there is at least a common 
item being argued over and measured. Service contracts inherently put more attention on 
the qualitative aspects of labor. Simple service contracts, like transportation or custodial 
services, have straightforward results to evaluate but can nonetheless introduce a host of 
concerns if, for example, taking place in contingency environments such as Afghanistan. 
Even familiar services like construction often must be evaluated not just on the quality of the 
final product but also the creation process which is often not contained in an easily 
measurable outcome and can bring a host of disruptions. The most challenging services can 
be those that do something new or ill-defined, where trying to put all the details in the 
contract at the outset might not only be an exercise in futility, but actively counterproductive. 
In such situations, the buyer and contractor have to solve problems together that were not 
fully anticipated when the contract was initiated. 
For the U.S. federal government, in particular the Department of Defense (DoD), 
services constitute a significant portion of contract spending but are often a lower priority 
from a regulatory and policy perspective. This is even more so the case when R&D is 
classified as a service, as it is for the purposes of this iteration of the paper. This 
observation comes not just from critics in Congress, which has a range of concerns about 
services contracts, but also from the DoD itself where improving services acquisition 
tradecraft was a prominent part of the Better Buying Power initiatives. Some of the history of 
these acquisition reform efforts can be seen in McCormick et al. (2015), Measuring the 
Outcomes of Acquisition Reform by Major DoD Components, but suffice to say the problems 
of services contracting have long been a known issue. 
While the prioritization of major defense acquisition programs over services 
acquisition is specific to the DoD, the challenges of services contracting are universally 
acknowledged—in the private sector, by sectors and levels of government, and in nonprofit 
organizations. This study takes a new quantitative look at services contract performance by 
employing the Federal Procurement Data System, an open source transaction database 
with records of more than a million service contracts within the past decade. This large 
dataset approach builds on past research regarding the public and private sector that often 
relied on surveys with smaller sample or case studies.  
Scope 
The research project seeks to answer the following questions:  
• Under what circumstances are services contracts likely to encounter challenges, 
as measured by terminations and cost ceiling breaches, or prosper, as measured 
by the exercising of options?  
• What services contracting policy choices influence these outcomes, for better or 
worse?  
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This iteration of the study focuses specifically on DoD contracts within a 2008 to 
2015 study period. Past CSIS work with the contract dataset have covered both products 
and services contracts, but to better focus on the challenges of services contracting, this 
effort has focused on service contract complexity, contract management capacity, and the 
relationship between the contractor and the buyer. Past CSIS studies have looked at the 
performance outcomes of terminations and ceiling breaches, and the final technical 
deliverable for this project will as well. However, for reasons of novelty and brevity, this 
paper focuses on a performance outcome the study team newly explored in this project: the 
choice of whether to exercise contract options and the implication of positive performance 
when the acquirer chooses to do so. 
Literature Review 
This literature review will clearly delineate the different aspects of services contract 
management in several sections. In general, this includes contract complexity, management 
capacity, and trust/relationships. Additionally, there are some service specific considerations 
that will be of use to this study. Finally, this review includes only the academic theory and 
evidence. It does not include GAO reports, but including these reports in the final product 
will provide a level of context for our findings and conclusions that will be invaluable. Useful 
tables have been included from the literature because they have value in articulating some 
of the more ambiguous concepts. 
There are incredibly few comprehensive definitions for contract management. For a 
broad definition, contract management may be defined as  
all activities performed by the government … that are relevant to contracts 
with private or nonprofit organizations … such as writing or creating the 
Invitation to Bid or Request for Proposal, devising a rating system for bid 
responses, rating the bid responses, awarding the contract, additional 
negotiations leading to a signed contract, and contract administration. 
(Lawther, 2002) 
Contract Complexity 
It stands to reason that the relative complexity of a given contract is a determinant of 
the level of cost (in labor, funds, or both) required by the government to effectively manage 
it, and in this vein, the literature delineates between low-, mid-, and high-complexity. For 
low-complexity contracts, “specificity and monitoring are simple and undemanding” (Joaquin 
& Greitens, 2012, p. 809). “Under mid-complexity scenarios, requests for proposals are 
more detailed and specific, and managers need to possess more technical expertise” 
(Joaquin & Greitens, 2012, 809). For highly complex services, and when understanding of 
the service delivery means are not clear, the agency and the contractor should enter into a 
true public-private partnership and recognize that the service to be provided will evolve in a 
dynamic manner, echoing studies by Fernandez (2007, 2009; Joaquin & Greitens, 2012, p. 
809). 
High levels of task complexity and uncertainty at the federal level can be considered 
as those tasks where the government requires a definitively new service or capability. From 
the defense perspective, this could be new software architecture, an emerging hardware 
technology, or specified research and development. Such high-complexity contracts 
complicate the ability of contract managers to write contractual requirements that are 
comprehensive and highly detailed, which most literature has presumed was a necessity in 
successful contracting. The results are mixed on the need for specificity. Brown and Potoski 
(2003, 2006) find support for this in overall contracting, while Fernandez (2007, 2009) 
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determines that asset specificity is unrelated to service contracting success. Moreover, even 
moderate levels of complexity and uncertainty increase the likelihood that some of the 
contract requirements will be erroneous. A successful contract, then, may require that the 
principal and agent interact frequently to make “necessary adjustments in work processes, 
performance standards, quantities, and prices” and fill in the gaps in the contract 
(Fernandez, 2007, p. 1127). One additional consideration is that, contracting for 
management tasks can carry a large amount of risk, specifically that the government will 
enter into a monopoly relationship with the vendor (Brown & Potoski, 2006, p. 327). 
Management Capacity 
While there are various definitions of management capacity in the literature, many of 
them do not create a complete picture of the actual scope of managing contracts. The all-
encompassing definition, as is required here, is provided by Brown and Potoski (2003):  
Contracting is not a one-size-fits-all proposition. The success or failure of 
any alternative service-delivery arrangement likely depends on how well 
governments can manage the entire contract process, from assessing the 
feasibility of contracting through implementation to monitoring and 
evaluation-activities that require strong government contracting capacity. 
Governments investing in contract-management capacity may be better 
positioned to harness the promise of effective contracting while avoiding its 
pitfalls. (p. 153).  
Governments invest in contract-management capacity because contracting is a 
complex process, fraught with potential problems and pitfalls. In fact, “governments can 
respond to poor conditions by investing in the managerial capacity to identify suitable 
situations for contracting, negotiate strong contracts, and monitor vendor performance” 
(Brown & Potoski, 2003, p. 162) Romzek and Johnston (2002) determine seven factors that 
positively influence service-contracting effectiveness: competition among providers, 
resource adequacy, planning for performance measurement, training for state contract 
managers, evaluation of contractor staffing capacity, evaluation of contractor financial 
management capacity, and theoretical rationale for reform. These and other responsibilities 
of the government as contract managers have been discussed, but they often fall into 
general bins. The overall literature expresses a range of opinions on the bins that explain 
management capacity. This is largely due to their different definitions and measures. 
However, the most popular systems come from Brown and Potoski (2003) and Yang, Hsieh, 
and Li (2009). Brown and Potoski (2003) determine three subfields of management 
capacity: assessment, implementation, and evaluation capacities. Yang et al. (2009) build 
on this model by adding another measure to Brown and Potoski’s system and renaming it. 
Therefore, formulation capacity for them is the same as implementation capacity for Brown 
and Potoski while Yang et al. determines implementation capacity to be the ability of the 
government to create and sustain a public-private partnership for contracts. This is an 
important delineation because many findings detail the effects of public-private partnership 
ability which is the capacity of the government to manage relationships and, as such, falls 
under management capacity. 
Diving into the separate bins, contract assessment is first in the process. Yang et al. 
(2009) find that increased assessment capacity is positively associated with cost reduction, 
but it is not associated with efficiency increase or quality improvement. Additionally, 
Fernandez (2007), using substantively weighted least squares to statistically identify the top 
performers, finds that ex ante evaluation (an assessment responsibility) is a significant 
determinant of the most successful contracts. Moreover, Yang et al. find a time component 
to management capacities. For agenda setting, the “process during which the values and 
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preferences of stakeholders are manifested and compromised,” the impact on cost reduction 
decreases as time passes for assessment (Yang et al., 2009, p. 687). Another aspect of 
assessment is the determination of asset specificity from the outset. Planning asset-specific 
requirements for either end product or production tasks requires significant expertise and 
insight. Brown and Potoski (2006) state that “managers need to master the complex 
production process in order to ensure that production tasks integrate with other processes 
required to deliver the service.” However, Fernandez (2007, 2009) finds under many 
different statistical methods (OLS, SWLS, 2SLS) that although it is common for government 
managers to develop design specifications and hand it to industry to build, this is a 
retrograde approach, which “makes it impossible to hold contractors responsible for 
delivering solutions that work, because as long as what's delivered meets the specifications, 
it’s the government’s fault if the products don’t work.” Interestingly enough, Fernandez 
(2007) finds that task uncertainty is a very significant factor in diminishing contract 
performance. This differentiation bears the distinction that defining the asset as specifically 
as possible does not necessarily define what the government wants contractors to 
accomplish in the contract. Additionally, this suggests another side where contract 
specification capacity is not the problem, but rather a cultural shift away from strictly 
measurable design specification into more of a capability-based contract could produce 
more efficient and higher quality products.  
As for implementation (formulation) capacities, the research is fairly anemic. These 
responsibilities vary but generally fall under “setting a fair bidding process, identifying the 
best-fit contractor, and reaching an excellent contract” (Yang et al., 2009, p. 683). Yang et 
al. find that an increase in formulation capacity does not affect contract performance. This is 
speculation, but it could be because much of this is process dependent, and much of where 
the human capital of capacity comes into effect is in the agenda setting stage, where a high-
level of skill and expertise is needed, whereas implementation capacity, the stage for 
creating the actual final contract, could be most affected by personnel numbers. One 
requires a few highly capable people for negotiation and technical requirements creation, 
while the act of creating the actual contract could a require a larger number of less skilled 
workers, but both could have the same overall management capacity. One illuminating point 
by Fernandez (2009) regarding the system rather than the workers indicates that “ongoing 
competition between contractors during the implementation phase, rather than ex ante 
competition during the bidding phase, appears to be the form of competition that improves 
overall contracting performance” (p. 86). 
As for the public-private governance capability, the literature is pretty clear-cut. There 
is widespread support among the evidence supporting the contract enhancing capacities of 
government and the private sector working together during the contracting period to 
increase the quality of the service. Speaking to the ability of the government in this respect, 
Yang et al. provide the most evidence. They use the term “to capture government agencies’ 
active, ongoing involvement in or support for the contractor’s operation. The core question 
involved here is, how can we help the contractor succeed?” It seems that the relationship is 
n-shaped, supporting the argument that, after reaching a point, extensive implementation 
activities may engender too much cost, red tape, and X inefficiencies. However, the function 
also shows that time has a magnifying effect. The impact of implementation capacity on cost 
reduction turns positive after the interaction efforts gain steam, and then, the impact of 
implementation activities on efficiency increases accelerates in that the benefits multiply as 
time passes, indicating that efforts to develop collaboration and mutual support will have 
long-term advantages (Yang et al., 2009, p. 692). Their results suggest that the 
government’s ability to influence mechanisms such as trust, parallel expectations, and joint 
action hold significant potential to improve contracting performance. Additionally, Fernandez 
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(2009) finds evidence that joint problem-solving efforts are positively correlated with overall 
contracting performance.  
In the last bin we have evaluation or monitoring capacity, which is the ability of the 
government to monitor a contractor’s performance and/or enforce the contract. Yang et al. 
(2009) suggest that the impact of the evaluation capacity depends on its strength: a strong 
evaluation system is beneficial, but a weak evaluation system does no good. They also 
show that a “strong evaluation capacity may promote cost reduction and efficiency increases 
but may not help improve quality” (Yang et al., 2009, p. 691). However, they also find that 
the benefits of evaluation activities decrease over time. This suggests that a contract needs 
more evaluation in the beginning, but that once the expectations are clearly established, 
things run much more smoothly. On the other hand, Fernandez (2007, 2009) do not show 
any significance of the impact of monitoring activities in either scope or intensity while the 
enforcement mechanism is mixed. Fernandez’s (2007) findings indicate that the most 
successful contractual relationships perform at higher levels when public managers make 
periodic use of the “stick” to enforce the contract.  
In fact, among the high performing cases, tactics such as imposing financial 
penalties and threatening to terminate the contract seem to enhance 
contracting performance more than alternative means for resolving 
disputes, such as negotiation and mediation, since the coefficient for 
reliance on alternative means for resolving disputes is not statistically 
significant. (Fernandez, 2007, p. 1135)  
Then, Fernandez (2009) finds the complete opposite for services for the exact same 
dataset. This would seem completely contradictory, but Fernandez (2007) utilized SWLS to 
identify the top performers and then conducted an OLS analysis of the whole sample and a 
WLS analysis with the weights going to the high-performers. Negotiation and mediation 
seem to work for the overall sample, but when compared to the most successful contracts, 
legal enforcement and threats win the day. This heavily indicates the need to differentiate 
between the different types of contracts.  
As for services specifically, much of the earlier literature evaluates service 
contracting as augmenting management capacity. Service delivery contracting includes 
producing the service but can also include delegating to vendors management 
responsibilities, such as monitoring outcomes.  
All service delivery management need not occur within government, though 
effective contracting clearly requires that governments maintain some 
management capacity. For example, even though governments can 
transfer some monitoring responsibilities to vendors, they likely still need 
to monitor their vendors’ performance to some degree. (Brown & Potoski, 
2006, p. 324)  
Alternatively, by contracting for management responsibilities contracts and 
introducing third party verifiers, governments may accumulate more monitoring than they 
would have been able to conduct on their own (Brown & Potoski, 2006) In the case of easy-
to-measure services, contract managers can focus more on outcome monitoring and less on 
the actual production of the service. In such cases, external monitoring becomes an 
attractive option, contract managers can quickly check the vendors’ intensive reports against 
their own outcome observations. Unfortunately, these cases are only available when 
services are easily monitorable with specific requirements. Otherwise, delegating complex 
monitoring to the vendor is obviously easily susceptible to the agent opportunism problem 
(Brown & Potoski, 2006). 
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Lastly, it is important to make the distinction between in-house management capacity 
and overall government capacity. While some cases of governance “may indeed see the 
abdication of management responsibilities, cutting management staff and activities does not 
necessarily translate into reducing management capacity” (Brown & Potoski, 2006, p. 325). 
Earlier literature indicated that government outsourcing the capacity to deliver the service 
diminished their direct capacity to manage the service. Yet, governments can, in fact “buy” 
management services to adequately address their own deficits in capacity (Brown & Potoski, 
2006, p. 324). This is corroborated in GAO reports of the defense acquisition workforce. For 
example, at the national level, many federal agencies now employ third-party evaluators to 
assess the quality of production activities for which they have contracted (e.g., information 
technology), a practice often referred to as “independent verification and validation.” 
Therefore, while the government may have reduced their in-house capacity, the overall 
capacity remains the same or even increases at lower costs. The tradeoff is that contracting 
and other forms of alternative service delivery do not eliminate the need for management 
capacity, but instead create an imperative for new types of management capacities. These 
problems may be more likely to occur in cases such as:  
 Limited or no competition among potential vendors 
 Contracted products and services that are difficult to specify and describe in 
written contracts  
 Vendors that have special knowledge or skills about the product that is 
unavailable to public managers 
 Public managers that have a hard time monitoring vendor performance once the 
contract has been let. (Brown & Potoski, 2003, p. 154) 
Trust/Relationships 
As has been mentioned above in the capacity responsibilities, trust, joint problem-
solving, and public-private partnerships have a huge impact on contracting performance. 
The earlier literature showed theoretical divides on the principal-agent problem and how 
government and the private sector should behave. Johnston and Romzek (1999) conclude 
that the agent’s (contractor’s) response to the principal’s monitoring system depends on 
many factors such as the reliability and credibility of the system as well as the principal’s 
willingness to enforce punishment. This game theory understanding of the principal-agent 
problem is complicated in government contracting as elected officials and networks of 
contractors add multiple layers of accountability. Additionally, “scholars have found that the 
overreliance on legal means of conflict resolution may evoke conflict, opportunism, and 
defensive behavior” (Yang et al., 2009, p. 686). Brown and Potoski (2006) provide evidence 
that longer contracts may also begin to mirror monopoly relationships, exposing 
governments to the risk that vendors will shirk their responsibilities. “Governments that 
entered into longer contracts spot checked vendor performance only 68 times a year on 
average, compared to 95 times a year, on average, for governments operating with short 
term contracts” (Brown & Potoski, 2006, p. 336) 
As the literature matured and developed ways to measure the relationship of the 
government and contractors, the tone adapted. Fernandez (2007) found that the effect of 
joint problem-solving on contracting performance is greater among the most successful 
contractual relationships than in the average case. Since contract managers work more 
closely with the contractor’s staff to solve issues that arise, the level of contracting 
performance tends to increase. In a later study, Fernandez found that trust has a positive 
independent effect on overall contracting performance and the largest coefficient in his 
model (Fernandez, 2009). However, some of the literature on trust suggests the possibility 
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of an endogenous relationship between trust and performance (Fernandez, 2009, p. 86). 
Fernandez then conducted a 2SLS regression to account for endogeneity. He determined 
that contract duration does not appear to interact with trust. That is, “the effect of trust on 
contracting performance does not increase as the relationship evolves over time” 
(Fernandez, 2009, p. 87). Additionally, he discovered that monitoring activities and trust do 
not serve as substitutes. Going deeper into the model as it is of great interest to this study,  
Factor analysis was used to develop multi-dimensional measures of 
communication, and joint problem-solving efforts after contract award. 
Since contracts of longer duration can facilitate learning and allow the 
parties more time to iron out the kinks in service delivery, the model also 
includes a measure of the duration of the contract, measured in months. 
(Fernandez, 2007, p. 1127) 
Finally, there are some scattered findings throughout the literature on the effect of 
management responsibilities that can affect relationships. When contracts specify in great 
detail how a service should be delivered, the contractor may have less incentive to innovate. 
Additionally, “lengthy negotiations can damage the relationship between partners and inhibit 
their adaptation to unanticipated situations” (Yang et al., 2009, p. 686). Yang et al. argue 
that “information searching, contract negotiation, and contract writing” give rise to 
transaction costs that can offset their cost-saving benefits, and that overuse of contracts for 
enforcement can curtail the development of trust and collaboration (Yang et al., 2009, p. 
690). As time goes on, what is more important is to develop authentic partnerships between 
the government and the contractor so that information can be shared and collaboration 
achieved (Yang et al., 2009, p. 693) As for efficiency, the overuse of contracts for 
enforcement may decrease efficiency, but, developing authentic partnerships during the 
implementation phase counteracts this, and the effect increases over time. Yang et al. go so 
far as to suggest that “the best contracting strategy for government is to depart from pure 
contracting and shift to a collaborative model such as public-private partnerships” (Yang et 
al., 2009, p. 692). Mentioning sub-relationships, Fernandez (2007) also examined the use of 
subcontractors because “arrangements involving multiple subcontractors imposes additional 
burdens on the prime contractor, including higher coordination costs, the likelihood of 
delays, and sometimes even conflict over the choice of goals and means, all of which 
ultimately weaken performance” (Fernandez, 2007, p. 1129). The use of multiple 
subcontractors was significant in the overall OLS sample but was not significant in the case 
of high performers. This indicates once again that it is paramount to find the distinctions 
between types of contracts as different types of contracts may have different mechanisms to 
develop trust. 
Conceptual Framework and Hypothesis 
This paper posits and tests a conceptual argument linking three categories of 
characteristics with services contract performance: first, service contract complexity; second, 
management capacity on the part of the buyer; and third, the strength of the relationship 
between the buyer and the contractor. By specifying all three characteristics, the argument 
captures the inherit challenges of services contracting, those most under the control of the 
buyer, and those most of interest to individual vendors. FPDS does not contain direct 
measures of these variables, and so the paper introduces proxies for each under the 
relevant hypothesis. 
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Service Complexity 
The complexity of the underlying service can introduce challenges in two broad 
ways. First, it may raise the technical expertise required from acquisition officials. A simple 
service, such as lawn mowing, can be easily specified and overseen while a more 
complicated service, like maintaining aircraft, requires a higher level of understanding and 
assurance, as important problems might not be immediately visible. The second aspect of 
complexity is the challenge of specifying the service in clear and comprehensive terms. 
When acquiring new services or ones that otherwise involve significant uncertainty, 
acquisition officials and contractors cannot simply rely on the initial performance work 
statement to deliver a successful outcome but will have to flexibly incorporate changing 
conditions or new information. This greater requirement for partnership asks more of both 
buyer and vendor and leaves much room for disagreement and conflicting interest. In both 
cases, this complexity makes the work more demanding and thus, all else equal, raises the 
risks of negative contracting outcomes. 
H1: As service complexity increases (decreases), the likelihood of cost ceiling 
breaches and terminations increases (decreases) and the likelihood of exercised 
options decreases (increases). 
The paper employs two labor-based measures to attempt to capture service complexity. 
Service contracting inherently emphasizes labor and measures of pay, and number of 
employees is a metric that can be relevant across disparate forms of services contracting. 
The first measure is the average salary for the North American Industrial 
Classification System (NAICS) detailed industry that the contract is classified under. Higher 
salaries may have multiple sources, but one of them is the difficulty of the work and the 
experience and education required. 
H1A: As average salary increases (decreases), the likelihood of cost ceiling breaches 
and terminations increases (decreases) and the likelihood of exercised options 
decreases (increases). 
The second measure is more services contracting specific: average cost per 
employee. At this stage of the research, the average cost is calculated based on averages 
for the given product or service code, though the study team hopes to incorporate direct 
contract-level measures where available in future iterations. It employs an existing 
government metric, called the invoice rate, that approximates how much the government is 
charged annually for each comparable full-time employee supporting the service contracts. 
A services contract with a large number of lower-paid staff would have a lower invoice rate, 
while one that employed a small number of experts or that had extensive capital costs would 
have a higher invoice rate. Similarly, a service contract that was just making contracting 
personnel directly available to the buyer in government facilities and using government 
equipment would, all else equal, have a lower invoice rate than a than one that also 
promised a full package of services and charged overhead for the infrastructure in place to 
help deliver them. As with average salary, this hypothesis assumes that scarcer labor or 
labor acquired at a greater premium, all else equal, indicates a more complex service.  
H1B: As average cost increase (decreases), the likelihood of cost ceiling breaches 
and terminations decrease (increases) and the likelihood of exercised options 
increase (decreases). 
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Contract Management Capacity 
Contract management capacity can manifest in a variety of forms, including 
assessment, contract formulation capacity, evaluation, and ability to sustain a public-private 
partnership. The literature affirmed the importance of this capacity, in particular for the more 
complex services discussed for H1. 
H2: As a contracting office’s contract management capacity increases (decreases), 
the likelihood of cost ceiling breaches and terminations decreases (increases).  
The first measure considered is the only one where FPDS reports on one of the 
capabilities discussed in the literature review: performance-based services acquisition 
(PBSA). Defined in FAR 37.601, PBSA tracks multiple measures relevant to public-private 
partnership governance including the foundation of how the contract is defined. A 
performance-based services acquisition “describes the requirements in terms of results 
required rather than the methods of performance of the work” (GSA Federal Procurement 
Data System, 2017, p. 52). Other characters included measurable performances standards, 
plans for monitoring, and the potential for monetary adjustments depending on the quality of 
the output.  
H2A: As contract office usage of performance-based services acquisition increases 
(decreases), the likelihood of cost ceiling breaches and terminations decreases 
(increases) and the likelihood of exercised options increases (decreases). 
For the other forms of management capacity, specific measures employed by prior 
surveys and case studies are not available within FPDS, and headcount data for contracting 
officers is not publicly available at the contracting office level. To capture this important but 
elusive variable, this paper employs a measure that scales based on the contracting office’s 
history. This approach assumes that the throughput with a given type of product or service 
code correlates with the development of technical expertise. As the prior section covered, 
complexity and expertise requirements can vary greatly from one category to another, and a 
contracting office may have high capacity in one area that would not translate to a new area. 
H2B: As the share of contracting office obligations for a given service code increases 
(decreases), the likelihood of cost ceiling breaches and terminations decreases 
(increases) and the exercised options decrease (increase) for that service. 
Extent of Prior Relationship 
The importance of partnership, trust, and handling difficult problems and uncertainty 
together naturally lead into the last characteristic: the relationship between the contractor 
and buyer. The literature suggests that a perfectly written contract is no guarantee of, nor 
substitute to, effective collaboration. In the absence of data directly on trust, this hypothesis 
focuses on the level of interaction that provides the opportunity to build a deeper 
relationship.  
H3: As the extent of the government’s prior relationship with its vendor increases 
(decreases), the likelihood of cost ceiling breaches and terminations for that 
partnership decreases (increases). 
The first measure is the number of past years of the relationship between the 
contracting office and the contractors with a single transaction in a given fiscal year enough 
to qualify. The second measure is the number of actions on the vendors contracts with that 
office in the prior year. Contract action counts vary wildly from contract to contract, but even 
if the obligated amount per action is small, they still represent more opportunities for 
interaction for the office and contractor. 
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H3A: As the number of past years of a vendor has contracted with an office increases 
(decreases), the likelihood of cost ceiling breaches and terminations for that 
partnership decreases (increases). 
H3B: As the number of contract actions a vendor has performed for an office in the 
past year increases (decreases), the likelihood of cost ceiling breaches and 
terminations for that partnership decreases (increases). 
Data and Methods 
Data Sources and Structure 
The primary source of this paper is FPDS, which is the transaction database for U.S. 
government contracts, including military and civilian as well as products and services. With 
some exclusions, such as classified contracts, the U.S. postal services, and the Defense 
Commissary Agency, U.S. federal government contracts above a $3,500 threshold are 
reported into FPDS. Services contracts are delineated using the product or service codes 
including in FPDS, and include R&D contracting for the purposes of this report. The study 
team maintains their own copy of the FPDS, which has been supplemented by the ad hoc 
search tool and information from various data dictionaries. This and past contract datasets 
are freely available for download for other researchers. 
FPDS data has been supplemented using the Services Contract Inventory mandated 
by the 2010 Consolidated Appropriations Act (GSA, n.d.). The study team continues working 
on importing and matching contracts from both the civilian agency data held by the GSA and 
the separate DoD dataset. At this stage in the research, the analysis relies not on the 
contract inventory itself, which is only available for larger contracts in the first place, but on 
the invoice rates derived for Product and Service Codes through the work of the U.S. Army. 
Those invoice rates are used on an annual basis to estimate the number of comparative full-
time employees for contracts in the inventory that lack more detailed data. They are broken 
out for both Overseas Contingency Operations, which are of special interest because they 
imply coverage of contractors supporting military operations overseas including those 
directly present in Iraq and Afghanistan. 
This report uses a unit of analysis of individual service contracts and task orders. 
These are identified in FPDS through the unique combination of a procurement identifier 
and, for task orders, a parent procurement identifier. The dataset is made up of completed 
contracts and task orders for services contracts for the DoD, completed between fiscal years 
2008 and 2015.1 Many of the variables in the dataset have been built up and tuned over 
three CSIS reports on Fixed-Price contracts, industrial consolidation and competition, and 
crisis-funded contracts (Hunter & Sanders, 2019; Hunter et al., 2019; Sanders & Hunter, 
2017). Services contracts are less numerically prevalent than their products counterparts but 
still constitute 1.3 million contracts and task orders. At this stage of the research, 24.2% by 
count and 21.0% by values obligated are eliminated from the sample because of missing 
data. The study team believes that recent upgrades to USAspending.gov may enable a 
reduction in this missing data rate. 
                                            
 
 
1 Completion is measured by having surpassed the current completion date of the contract or task 
order by at least one year or by contract close out or a partial or complete contract termination. 
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The exercised options outcome variable focuses on a narrower subset of contracts 
and task orders, namely those with unexercised options as of their initial transaction. This 
reduces the count tenfold, only 103,000 contracts and task orders qualify. However, 
excluding these contracts from the options exercised sample is important because the 
choice of whether or not to include options in a contract is a contract formulation decision 
and not a direct reflection of performance on a given contract. The importance of contracts 
and task orders with options is affirmed by their value, they account for 23.7% of the total 
services dataset. Their missing data rate is similar to the overall dataset with a reversal 
between the metrics, data is missing for 20.1% of contracts and task orders by count and 
23.7% by value. Henceforth in this study, for simplicity, both contract awards and task orders 
will be referred to simply as contracts, except in those cases where the distinction matters.  
Measures of Dependent and Independent Variables 
This paper focuses on the new dependent variable, options exercised, though the 
final report of this study will include all three variables. 
Dependent Variables 
Terminations evaluates whether a contract has experienced a partial or complete 
termination at any point in its lifespan. This includes terminations for default and 
convenience (partial or complete) as well as terminations for cause and legal contract 
cancellations. Perhaps unintuitively, this can include both a traditional cancellation of a 
major weapon system and the cancellation and reassignment of a contract due to a bid 
protest. 
Ceiling Breaches is a measure that attempts to track the risk cost increases. It 
tracks whether a contract’s cost ceiling has increased as part of a change order or definitize 
change order. This measure focuses on change orders, rather than modifications for 
additional work, because the combination of a change order and an increase in ceiling 
suggests an unanticipated development that will cost the acquirer more money. As shown in 
Table 1 both ceiling breaches and terminations are rare, though contracts experiencing 
ceiling breaches account for a bit under a fifth of all contract obligations. Perhaps 
surprisingly, overlap between these variables is small. 




Ceiling Breach  0 (None)  99.0%  81.4% 
1 (Ceiling Breach)  1.0%  18.6% 






Exercised Options, in contrast to the other two metrics, is a positive measure of 
contract performance. They reflect that the buyer has chosen to acquire additional services 
within the scope of the original contract and is willing to pay a higher price as a result. One 
common source of options is multiple year contracts where the original “base” contract only 
covers the first year. Both government and contractor may assume that this extension will 
take place with a high degree of confidence, but in strictly legalistic terms the buyer is under 
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no obligation to continue and may unilaterally allow the contract to end without the liability 
that may be incurred in a termination. 
A transaction only qualifies as an exercised option if it meets all of the three following 
criteria: 
1. The reason for modification is an exercised option, a supplemental agreement for 
work within scope, or a funding only action.  
2. The base and exercised options value of the contract increases as part of the 
transaction. 
3. The base and all options value of the contract does not increase as part of the 
transaction. 
The study team used this conservative definition in order to ensure that exercised 
options were clearly differentiated from cost overruns. The metric is calculated in obligated 






Taking a simple example, imagine a five-year contract with a ceiling of $50,000 that 
starts with a base of one year and $10,000. If no options were ever exercised the value of 
metric would be steady at 1 (1+$0/$10,000). If a $10,000 second year option was exercised, 
then then the metric would rise to 2 (1+$10,000/$10,000). If all four options were exercised, 
then the metric would rise to 5 (1+$40,000/$10,000). The variable is logged, but not 
centered because it is an outcome variable. 
Variable 
Name 















1 58,837,341 1 1.047 0.642* 1.706 0.287% 0.418% 
* 1 Unit below value below minimum value. 
Study Independent Variables 
Service Contract Complexity 
Average Salary: Each contract in FPDS is labeled by its NAICS Detailed Industry 
category, the most granular level available. The U.S. Economic Census provides enough 
data to calculate average wage, although it is only available every five years and thus has a 
variable lag based of one to five years based on the time since the last census.  
Invoice Rate: What is the average annual charge rate for comparable full-time 
employees. The invoice rate is available through the Service Contract Inventory and is 
dependent on U.S. Army calculations at the individual Product or Service Code level or for 
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the broad service category.2 When the invoice rate for a specific product or service code is 
available for the prior fiscal year, that factor is used. When the invoice rate is available for a 
code but not for the prior year, the average across all years is imputed. For those codes with 
no reported invoice rates, the broad service code is used instead for that year if available, 
and an average of the invoice rate for all available years is used otherwise.  
Table 2 shows the descriptive statistics for these variables, which are logged and 
rescaled in the model. 
Table 2. Average Salary and Invoice Rate 
Variable	
Name	














$8,690 $24,7576 $54,192 $50,890 $22,358 $115,834 2.83% 0.899% 
Invoice	
Rate	
$9,710 $1,762,137 $170,918 $167,767 $63,862. $440,726.2 7.53% 13.0%  
 
Contract Management Capacity 
Partnership (Lagged): What share of office obligations for a given office were for 
Performance Based Services Contracting in the prior year.  
Service Experience: For any given contract, what percentage of obligations for the 
office went to contracts with the same product or service code over the past seven years. 
Table 3 shows the descriptive statistics for these variables, which are rescaled in the model. 
Table 3. Partnership and Service Experience 
Variable 
Name 












Partnership    0%  100%  27.8%  33.9%  -26.2%*  93.9%  0.03%  0% 
Service 
Experience 
0%  100%  1.9%  14.0%  -37.9% *  62.7%  0.03%  0%  
Paired	Years  0  7  4  3.49  -1.35* 8.33*   0.147% 0.344% 
* 1 unit below values are less than minimal value for variable. 
 
Extent of Prior Relationship 
Paired Years: For any given contract’s vendor and office pairing, how many of the 
past seven years involved interaction between the vendor and the office. For a new 
relationship, this value would be zero. Table 43 shows the descriptive statics for this 
variable, which is rescaled in the model. 
                                            
 
 
2 Product or Service Codes have four characters. Services codes start with a letter, while product 
codes start with a number. The broad services category (e.g., the letter Y for construction or the letter 
D for automated data processing) refers to the first letter of the services code. 
Acquisition Research Program: 
Creating Synergy for Informed Change - 245 - 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Paired Actions (Lagged): For any given contract’s vendor and office pairing, how 
many contracting actions did the vendor perform for that office across all contracts in the 
prior year. Table 43 shows the descriptive statistics for this variable, which is incremented by 
1 to make zeros eligible for logarithmic transformation and is then logged and rescaled. 
Table 43. Paired Actions 
Variable	
Name	














1** 7,806,579 26 32.751 0.5 * 2,249 0.032% 0.013% 
* 1 unit below values are less than minimal value for variable. ** True minimum value is 0. 
Empirical Approach 
At this stage of the research, the study team has created the exercise options 
models for each of the independent variables. The study used ordinary least squares 
regression to analyze the logged proportion of growth in exercised options compared to the 
base. The additional models for the other two dependent variables, ceiling breaches and 
terminations, will be added at a subsequent stage of the study but will use a broadly similar 
structure. Those additional models are presently intended to use maximum likelihood logit 
analysis, as they are presently structured as binary variables. 
For all of these models, the study team captures the residual differences between 
the contracting office and agencies, the detailed industries and sub-sectors, and the 
countries of performances through the use of multilevel modeling techniques. This approach 
adopts techniques employed by Gelman and Hill (2017) and Sommet and Morselli (2017) 
that allow for a different intercept for each of the hierarchical industrial sectors, customers, 
and places of performance. These are referred to as level 2 and 3 variables, with the level 2 
variables, office, and detailed NAICS6 nested under the level 3 variables, agency, and 
NAICS3. The five multilevel groupings employed in this model are shown in Table 5.  
Table 5.. Level 2 and Level 3 Variables Included in the Model 
Name  Level  Type  Description 
NAICS3  3  Categorical  Subsector Code with 108 groups for services contracts within the study period. 
NAICS6  2  Categorical  Detailed Industry Code with 1m069 groups for services contracts within the study period. 
Agency  3  Categorical  Contracting Agency Code with 24 groups for services contracts within the study period. 
Office  2  Categorical  Contracting Office Code with 1,185 groups for services contracts within the study period. 
Place  2  Categorical  Country in which the contract was performed with 198 groups for services contracts within 
the study period. 
 
The more traditional level 1 inputs, in addition to the study variables discussed in the 
prior section, included three varieties of inputs as controls. The first category focus on the 
pairing of the contract’s vendor and office and are new to this paper. 
 Office and vendor-office pair variables: 
o Office Volume: Total office obligations in the prior seven fiscal years.  
o Office Count: Number of distinct contracts and task orders the office 
managed in the prior fiscal year. 
o Market Share: What percentage of an office’s obligations are accounted 
for by this vendor. This can be driven by a multitude of factors, including 
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general vendor success and size regardless of the relationship with a 
given office. A high value in this variable may reflect vendor lock. 
 Subsector-level and detailed industry variables:  
o Both levels included the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index measures that 
consolidation measures. 
o Both levels also include the ratio of total defense obligations to U.S.-wide 
revenues.  
o In addition, the defense obligations for each detailed industry are added 
to the model. 
 Contract-level variables: 
o Scope as measured by initial contract ceiling and duration. 
o Competition, which has a baseline of no competition and three 
alternatives: competition, available for competition but receiving only 1 
offer, 2–4 offers, 5+ offers. 
o Vehicle, which has a baseline of definitive contracts and purchase orders, 
but also includes four types of indefinite delivery vehicles: Single-Award 
IDCs (S-IDC); Multi-award IDCs (M-IDCs); Federal Supply Schedule or 
Government-Wide Acquisition Contract (FSS-GWAC); and Blank 
Purchase Agreement or Basic Ordering Agreement (BPA-BOA). 
o Pricing, which uses firm-fixed price as a baseline with six alternatives 
handled by dummy variables: incentive fee contracts (whether fixed price 
or cost-based), combination; combination or other contracts which include 
multiple types, time and materials, labor hours, or fixed price: level of 
effort (T&M/LH/FP:LoE); other fixed price (other FP) including all types of 
fixed price not covered by earlier categories; whether the contract began 
as an undefinitized contract award (UCA); and other cost-based (other 
CB) covering all types of cost-based contracts not covered by earlier 
categories. 
o Crisis Funding: Baseline of drawing from non-emergency accounts with 
three alternatives for OCO, disaster response, and the Recovery Act 
(ARRA). 
Preliminary Results and Discussion 
Inventory of Contracts Services 
The Inventory of Contracted Services (ICS) is mandated across the federal 
government and has an obvious value to this project above and beyond the inclusion of the 
invoice rate variable. By statute, the DoD has a separate inventory process from the GSA 
process that includes extracting contract data from the Federal Procurement Data System 
(FPDS) and the System for Award Management (SAM). The study team analyzed ICS data 
from both the DoD and the GSA to better understand service contract complexity and found 
that each source has its own set of challenges. Generally, since FY 2012, DoD ICS data 
includes comparable contractor full-time equivalents (CFTE) related information with clear 
ICS guidance and information available. GSA ICS data by comparison is easier to import 
because it is not spread across many, somewhat inconsistent, Excel tabs. However, GSA 
ICS relies on supplemental documents for explanation and has not published these 
supporting documents at all for some years since the start of the ICS, posing difficulties in 
cross-checking and reference.  
According to CSIS data processing methods, three-stage standardization was 
applied to the raw data from government websites. The main challenge along the procedure 
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was the inconsistent format in which the data was reported and published, which potentially 
complicated the consolidation process before import to CSIS database system, especially 
for validating data type, generating unique identifiers, etc. Additionally, inadequate 
explanation of the certain amount of missing values hinders the utility for further analysis.  
Figure 5. Comparable Full-Time Employee Invoice Rate of Top 20 Prime Service 
Code (Ordered Horizontally by Invoice Amount) 
 
Nonetheless, the study team was successful in importing and using key DoD 
guidance documents. One key piece of the results is shown Figure 5 where the invoice rates 
for top 20 service codes are shown, listed by volume. The broad patterns align with 
expectations: “Operation/Dining Facilities” and “Custodial–Janitorial Services” have the 
lowest invoice rates. By comparison, more complex services like “Government-Owned 
Contractor Operated R&D Facilities” and “Architect-Engineering Services” are fairly high. 
However, this investigation did reveal oddities in the later years, with multiple categories 
suddenly declining in 2016 and with some categories collapsing their rate in 2017. 
Sometimes the end of a single large contract can do a great deal to explain fluctuations, as 
the study team found with Waste Treatment & Storage Facilities, but that explanation did not 
hold in other cases. Because this variable is defined to use lagged data, the 2016 and 2017 
invoice rates are not included in any of the statistics; that said, the study team intends a 
closer examination of this issue as one of the next steps of this project. 
Bivariate Analysis of Study Variables 
The first step in model building is to look at the relationship of each of the study 
variables to the output variables. Table 6 shows the minimal logit model, not yet including 
controls or multiple levels, for the six variables covered in the hypotheses. Each variable is 
examined one-on-one followed by Model 7 which includes all six variables. When analyzing 
these coefficients, the greater the magnitude of the coefficient, the greater the estimated risk 
of ceiling breaches. 
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Table 6. Logit Bivariate Look at Study Variables and Ceiling Breaches 
Model	1	 Model	2	 Model	3	 Model	4	 Model	5	 Model	6	 Model	7	
(Intercept) ‐2.83 (0.01)*** ‐2.83 (0.01)*** ‐2.83 (0.01)*** ‐2.88 (0.01)*** ‐2.83 (0.01)*** ‐2.82 (0.01)*** ‐2.89 (0.01)*** 
Services Complexity        
     Log(Det. Ind. Salary) 0.12 (0.02)***      -0.03 (0.02) 
     Log(Service Invoice Rate)  0.15 (0.02)***     0.16 (0.02)*** 
Office Capacity        
     Office Perf.-Based %   0.14 (0.02)***    ‐0.16 (0.02)*** 
     Office Service Exp. %    0.66 (0.01)***   0.72 (0.02)*** 
Past Relationship        
     Paired Years     ‐0.10 (0.02)***  ‐0.20 (0.02)*** 
     Log(Paired Actions)      0.29 (0.02)*** 0.03 (0.02) 
AIC 107637.39 107605.76 107621.00 105650.20 107646.22 107430.81 105389.27 
BIC 107658.25 107626.62 107641.86 105671.06 107667.08 107451.67 105462.28 
Log Likelihood -53816.69 -53800.88 -53808.50 -52823.10 -53821.11 -53713.41 -52687.64 
Deviance 107633.39 107601.76 107617.00 105646.20 107642.22 107426.81 105375.27 
Num. obs. 250000 250000 250000 250000 250000 250000 250000 
***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05, ·p < 0.1. Numerical inputs are rescaled. 
 
When considered alone, both measures of service complexity match H1 as higher 
salaries and invoice rates estimate a higher risk of ceiling breaches. However, when both 
variables are included in the same model, only the Service Invoice Rate remains significant 
and the direction of the relationship for average salary flips. For Office capacity, the 
individual results do not support H2, as both the percent of performance-based services an 
office performs and the office share of experience with a given service predict a higher rate 
of ceiling breaches. When the variables are combined, H2A is supported but H2B is not. A 
look at summary statistics for Performance-Based experience did find that as the percent of 
performance-based service went from 0% to 75%, the ceiling breach rate declined. Above 
75%, it rose dramatically, suggesting an additional variable may influence that relationship. 
The results were also mixed for H3, as more paired years of history was associated with 
fewer breaches while more contracting actions between the office and the vendor in the 
prior year was associated with more. When all the study variables were included, the results 
for H3A remained significant and the results for H3B lost significance. 
The next output variable is terminations and the bivariate results are shown in Table 7. 
Table 7. Logit Bivariate Look at Study Variables and Terminations 
Model	1	 Model	2	 Model	3	 Model	4	 Model	5	 Model	6	 Model	7	
(Intercept) ‐4.04 (0.02)*** ‐4.04 (0.02)*** ‐4.04 (0.02)*** ‐4.06 (0.02)*** ‐4.04 (0.02)*** ‐4.04 (0.02)*** ‐4.06 (0.02)*** 
Services Complexity        
     Log(Det. Ind. Salary) ‐0.12 (0.03)***      ‐0.25 (0.04)*** 
     Log(Service Invoice Rate)  -0.03 (0.03)     0.06 (0.03)· 
Office Capacity        
     Office Perf.-Based %   0.17 (0.03)***    0.00 (0.03) 
     Office Service Exp. %    0.41 (0.03)***   0.28 (0.03)*** 
Past Relationship        
     Paired Years     -0.03 (0.03)  ‐0.25 (0.04)*** 
     Log(Paired Actions)      0.50 (0.03)*** 0.51 (0.04)*** 
AIC 43737.75 43751.99 43723.28 43523.03 43751.85 43508.97 43317.42 
BIC 43758.60 43772.85 43744.14 43543.88 43772.71 43529.83 43390.43 
Log Likelihood -21866.87 -21873.99 -21859.64 -21759.51 -21873.92 -21752.49 -21651.71 
Deviance 43733.75 43747.99 43719.28 43519.03 43747.85 43504.97 43303.42 
Num. obs. 250000 250000 250000 250000 250000 250000 250000 
***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05, ·p < 0.1. Numerical inputs are rescaled. 
The termination results, with a single exception, do not support the hypotheses or 
are not significant. For H1, higher average salaries predict a lower risk of terminations. The 
relationship with invoice rate does predict a lower risk of terminations once all six variables 
are included, but is only significant with a p-value <0.1. For H2 both office capacity variables 
estimate a higher risk of termination in isolation and the office use of performance-based 
services contracting has no estimated influence on outcomes once all six variables are 
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included. The one place the hypotheses finds support is H3A, paired years, which estimates 
a lower risk of termination, but only once all six variables are included. Paired actions is 
significant in both cases, but estimates a greater, not a lesser, risk of terminations. 
The final output variable is options exercised, which involves two important changes 
in interpretation. First, this model uses regression because it is estimated the amount of 
growth attributable to options and not simply whether or not any options were exercised. 
Second, for the prior to variables, negative coefficients are associated with better outcomes, 
that is, fewer ceiling breaches and terminations. For Table 8, the direction is reversed, as 
positive values in the coefficient indicate that proportionally larger options are likely to be 
awarded. Finally, note that the number of contracts in the sample drops dramatically, as 
contracts with available options are less common, though higher in value on average. 
Table 8. Regression Bivariate Look at Study Variables and Log(Options Growth) 
Model	1	 Model	2	 Model	3	 Model	4	 Model	5	 Model	6	 Model	7	
(Intercept) 0.65 (0.00)*** 0.63 (0.00)*** 0.62 (0.00)*** 0.62 (0.00)*** 0.62 (0.00)*** 0.63 (0.00)*** 0.66 (0.00)*** 
Services Complexity        
     Log(Det. Ind. Salary) ‐0.19 (0.00)***      ‐0.14 (0.01)*** 
     Log(Service Invoice Rate)  ‐0.21 (0.00)***     ‐0.14 (0.01)*** 
Office Capacity        
     Office Perf.-Based %   ‐0.06 (0.01)***    ‐0.06 (0.01)*** 
     Office Service Exp. %    0.10 (0.01)***   0.14 (0.01)*** 
Past Relationship        
     Paired Years     ‐0.01 (0.00)**  ‐0.04 (0.01)*** 
     Log(Paired Actions)      0.06 (0.00)*** 0.07 (0.01)*** 
AIC 165175.62 165387.96 167067.06 166831.95 167195.69 167039.85 163626.85 
BIC 165203.59 165415.93 167095.03 166859.92 167223.66 167067.82 163701.43 
Log Likelihood -82584.81 -82690.98 -83530.53 -83412.97 -83594.85 -83516.93 -81805.42 
Deviance 35689.57 35781.35 36515.49 36411.79 36572.34 36503.47 35022.97 
Num. obs. 82675 82675 82675 82675 82675 82675 82675 
***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05, ·p < 0.1. Numerical inputs are rescaled. 
 
The options variable presently offers the strongest support for the hypothesis. As per 
H1, both individually and together, higher salaries and invoice rates estimate lower value of 
exercised options. For H2, office capacity, the result is split. Greater experience with 
performance-based services is associated with a lower value of exercised options while 
office experience with a given service is associated with a greater value in exercised 
options. The support for H3 is also split, where paired years are associated with lesser 
growth in options exercised while paired contracts actions in the prior year are associated 
with more options.  
Next Steps 
The study team is presently incorporating a range of controls into all three models. 
Of particular interest are the controls for contracting office and the office-vendor relationship, 
which might help clarify the initially contradictory results for H2 and H3. The study team is 
also looking at whether converting to constant dollars, perhaps using the contract start year 
for deflation purposes, is an option, as temporal effects could be particularly important for 
invoice rates and salaries, as both tend to rise over time. Additional attention to quality 
issues in the services contract inventory is also planned, as the information captured by the 
inventory is of great interest, but the initial analysis and importing process revealed a variety 
of data quality challenges. The study team is looking with interest whether, after introduction 
of controls, some hypotheses retain split decisions. For example, more years of paired 
experience estimates a lower risk of ceiling breaches and terminations, but also a lesser 
growth in exercised options.  
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